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The world’s twenty-year experiment with a rule-based international trading order is most likely ending. Trade
wars are raging again for the first time in two decades as World Trade Organization (WTO) members unilaterally
impose and counterimpose sanctions.1 In Geneva, the WTOAppellate Body, whose existence is essential to the
functioning of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), is on a trajectory to shut down in December
2020. For all the fireworks, however, many commentators retain an optimism that the recent events will be a pass-
ing phase and that the world will return to a more law-oriented trading system after the present crisis.
This essay is less sanguine and argues that recent events may have damaged the WTO irreparably. The present
departure from enforcement norms is potentially devastating because it goes to the heart of what has provided the
WTO with such influence in global economic affairs: the willingness of member countries to accept the WTO legal
systemas a binding constraint on state action, evenwhen costly domestically.Having abandoned theDSUframework,
will countries once again view the WTO rule-based system as mandatory? Or will the WTO become more like other
global institutions whose ability to constrain member countries is modest, notwithstanding hard treaty obligations?
To illustrate why returning to a rule-of-law systemwill be so difficult, this essay describes theWTO enforcement
norms and highlights why they are significant toWTO success.2 It then explains how the current American admin-
istration has violated these norms and how other WTOmember countries have followed suit in response, leading
to widespread disregard for the DSU framework. Finally, it analyzes how the precedent of opting out of the DSU
framework may have changed actors’ beliefs about whether abiding by the DSU is obligatory and beneficial in the
long-term. Once these beliefs have shifted, the political costs of returning to a rule-based system rise, and the
likelihood of further violations increases. In short, a world of more power-based bargaining may be returning,
and the value of the WTO to all countries will be greatly diminished.
WTO Enforcement Norms
The strong WTO legal system is unique among global institutions. Often called the WTO’s crown jewel, the
DSU establishes a rule-based adjudicatory process with compulsory jurisdiction over all WTOmember countries,
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a broad jurisdictional scope over almost all of the WTO Agreements, a right of appeal to the seven-member
Appellate Body, and procedures for assessing damages and authorizing retaliation (if a member country maintains
its breach of substantive trade rules). However, the influence of the WTO legal system is equally due to the near
perfect record of WTO member country compliance with the DSU framework. Not only do the WTO
Agreements call for binding dispute resolution, but member countries have followed these rules faithfully, not
acting outside of the DSU until recently. It is this acceptance of a constraint by member countries—and the beliefs
of subnational actors that these constraints are unavoidable—that has made WTO adjudication such a force in
international affairs.
WTO enforcement norms do not require WTOmember countries to always comply with substantive trade rules.
Instead, WTO enforcement norms provide a framework that structures how WTO members address allegations
of noncompliance with trade rules.3 In fact, many of the enforcement norms address circumstances where the
respondent country does not ultimately bring its policies into compliance with WTO substantive rules. Thus,
even as WTOmembers did not invariably comply with the WTO substantive rules, compliance with the enforce-
ment norms—the rule-of-law framework that addresses trade policy—was nearly perfect until 2016.
The WTO norms that have effectively governed trade disputes for two decades involve three major principles:
acceptance of multilateral adjudication, a prohibition on counterretaliation, and the regulation of remedies.
Acceptance of Multilateral Adjudication
A core principle of the WTO is that its members must not take any actions regarding alleged breaches of trade
rules without going through the WTO dispute settlement system.4 This means that complaining countries cannot
impose sanctions (called “retaliation” or “rebalancing”) until the multilateral adjudicatory system has completed its
work.5 As an example, in the 1990s and early 2000s, the United States maintained that the European Union’s ban
on beef treated with growth hormones was a breach of trade rules. Following WTO enforcement norms, the
United States waited until it successfully challenged the European Union’s policy before it imposed sanctions.
This is particularly notable since, under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 system, the United
States had imposed unilateral retaliation for more mild EU restrictions on beef.6
Similarly, WTO norms require complaining countries not to impose any sanctions if they lose their cases in
disputes settlement. For instance, in an early WTO case, the United States lost its claim against Japan regarding
alleged unfair trading practices in the photographic film industry.7 Although many influential legislators and
3 In previous work, I have referred to this as the difference between breaching trade rules (first order rules) and violatingWTOenforcement
rules (second order rules). It is possible to breach trade rules but still remain within the WTO’s enforcement framework. See Rachel
Brewster, Pricing Compliance: When Formal Remedies Displace Reputational Sanctions, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 259, 300–01 (2013).
4 This principle is embodied in Article 23 of the DSU, committing member countries to multilateral adjudication of disputes. See
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 23, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU]. While the DSU has a number of rules and
procedures, this rule is part of the fundamental bargain of the WTO system—that the United States would forgo unilateral sanctioning and
accept multilateral adjudication of trade disputes if the system were legally binding and capable of authorizing retaliation. See Panel Report,
United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R (adopted Feb. 28, 2000) (describing howArt. 23 of the DSU is a
core principle of the WTO dispute settlement system).
5 The DSU permits arbitration outside of the WTO system if both parties agree. See DSU, supra note 4, art. 25. Parties are also encour-
aged to settle claims without WTO adjudication. Id., art. 3(7).
6 See CHARAN DEVEREAUX ET AL., 2 CASE STUDIES IN US TRADE NEGOTIATION: RESOLVING DISPUTES 51, 72–73 (2006).
7 See Panel Report, Japan—Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, WT/DS44/R (adopted Apr. 23, 1998).
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industry groups urged the Clinton administration to impose unilateral sanctions on Japan to force its government
to negotiate, the United States accepted the decision and dropped its complaint.8
Prohibition on Counterretaliation
If a respondent state has lost its case but maintains its breach of trade rules, it must accept retaliation—most
often in the form of higher tariffs—and cannot threaten counterretaliation. This aspect of the WTO enforcement
norms is critical to preventing trade wars by limiting the right to retaliate to successful complainants. For example,
when the United States successfully challenged the EU hormone-beef ban, the European Union refused to change
its policy but nonetheless accepted the right of the United States to raise tariffs on EU goods so long as it was in
breach of trade rules.9 Similarly, when Brazil successfully challenged American cotton subsidies, the United States
agreed to compensate Brazil, paying US$147 million annually for several years, instead of threatening
counterretaliation.10
Regulating Remedies
Member countries must accept the WTO’s authority to determine the appropriate level of retaliation.
Complaining countries cannot impose additional economic sanctions to increase the pressure on recalcitrant
respondents.11 This principle prevents the escalation of trade disputes by placing limits on retaliation and provides
clarity on the price of substantive noncompliance. Returning again to the EU’s ban on hormone-beef, American
sanctions were not sufficient to change the EU’s policy, but the United States did not increase its retaliation above
WTO-authorized levels to pry open European markets.
In sum, WTOmembers’ acceptance of these three principles of dispute settlement provided the foundation for
the rule-based trading order. Although governments do not always comply with WTO substantive law, countries’
commitment (until recently) to these enforcement norms provided a stable and beneficial basis for international
economic relations.
The Breakdown in Norms
Recent practice by the United States represents a dramatic departure from major economies’ past respect and
careful cultivation of WTO enforcement norms. The U.S. actions have additionally had follow-on effects with
other global economic powers, including the European Union, China, Canada, and others. There are at least
three ways in which American policies have violated WTO enforcement norms and prompted other countries
to similarly abandon these norms: Section 301 actions, Section 232 actions, and the block on the Appellate
Body appointments.
8 Paul B. Stephan, Sheriff or Prisoner? The United States and the World Trade Organization, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 49, 57–58 (2000).
9 The European Union continued to contest whether its ban was a breach of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement.
Appellate Body Report, United States—Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC—Hormones Dispute, WT/DS320/AB/R
(adopted Oct. 16, 2008).
10 Randy Schnepf, Status of the WTO Brazil-U.S. Cotton Case 3–4 (Congressional Research Service, Feb. 11, 2014).
11 Panel Report, European Communities—Regime for the Sale, Importation and Distribution of Bananas—Recourse to Arbitration by
the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU, para. 6.3, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU (adopted Mar. 24, 2000).
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Section 301 Actions
In June 2018, the U.S. government imposed unilateral sanctions against China for allegedly engaging in unfair
trade practices with regards to intellectual property and state subsidies.12 The United States filed claims at the
WTO regarding some of these allegations, but it left the DSU framework by immediately imposing sanctions
on Chinese products (initially US$50 billion in June 2018, but increased to US$250 billion in September
2018).13 This is the U.S. government’s first use of Section 301 sanctions outside of the WTO framework since
the WTO’s creation.
The American action created a situation where the Chinese government had to decide whether to respond
quickly or wait for WTO adjudication. Unsurprisingly, given the unilateral nature of the American action,
China responded immediately and unilaterally as well, and also applied sanctions without making use of the
multilateral system.14
Both the American and the Chinese actions violate the principle of multilateral adjudication of trade disputes
and the principle that the WTO should determine the remedy (if any). The countries’ disregard of these rules has
created the most dramatic and rapidly escalating trade war since the end of the Cold War.
Section 232 Actions
The United States has also imposed tariffs on aluminum and steel imports fromWTOmembers, in the name of
national security. The American claims of national security justifications for these goods strain credulity, and the
tariffs have imposed unexpected economic costs on military allies and adversaries alike.15 The European Union
filed a complaint at the WTO, but also declared that it will treat these tariffs as safeguards, a domestic measure
designed to respond to a surge of imports. By reclassifying the tariffs as safeguards, the European Union claims
that it can adopt compensatory measures—through higher tariffs—immediately. Although the EU’s unilateral
measure is an understandable attempt to react in real time to the United States’ very broad national security
claim, it also violates the WTO enforcement norms that these matters should be subject to multilateral adjudica-
tion. Other states, such as Mexico and Canada, have similarly adopted unilateral responses.
Block on Appellate Body Members
Although the U.S. block on the appointment or reappointment of Appellate Body members is not a breach of
any rules or procedures embodied in the DSU, the action represents a direct attack on the functioning of theWTO
enforcement system. Unless disputing parties agree to a process, without Appellate Body members, the DSU can-
not function because it cannot provide the appeal to whichWTO countries are entitled under theDSU framework.
This means that the dispute cannot be resolved because the case cannot be forwarded to the Dispute Settlement
Body, the entire WTOmembership sitting in its dispute settlement role, for adoption.16 The United States thereby
12 SeeChad P. Bown et al.,Trump and China Formalize Tariffs on $260 Billion of Imports and LookAhead to Next Phase, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L
ECON. (Sept. 20, 2018).
13 See Bown & Kolb, supra note 1.
14 Id. Like the United States, China has filed a case but did not wait for WTO adjudication to counterretaliate.
15 Jennifer A. Hillman, Trump Tariffs Threaten National Security, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2018).
16 The Dispute Settlement Body adopts Appellate Body reports by reverse consensus: the report is adopted unless there is a consensus
against adoption. This has never happened in practice. Instead of going through the DSU process, WTOmembers could alternatively agree
to arbitration or to waive appeals on an ad hoc basis, but respondent states are unlikely to accept these alternatives.
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effectively is forcing other WTOmembers out of the multilateral adjudication system as well—in most cases, with
no alternative dispute settlement system. As former WTO Appellate Body member Jennifer Hillman has noted:
[W]hat everyone expects is that no one will wait for an appeals decision if there is not an appellate body
division that can hear the appeal… . No country is likely to wait like that. So they start then to take a uni-
lateral action—to go ahead to retaliate or other unilateral action against the country with whom they had the
dispute. And the concern is that then that country says, “that action was not lawful”… and you end up with
the possibility of a mini-trade war in each and every dispute that comes before the WTO dispute settlement
system.17
These three trade actions have significantly undermined enforcement norms. The United States and other WTO
members have eschewed multilateral dispute settlement, have engaged in counterretaliation, and have imposed
escalating trade sanctions. Together with the block on Appellate Body member appointments, these actions rep-
resent a rejection of the existing enforcement system.
Are We Heading Toward a Power-Based Future?
The departure of WTO member countries en masse from WTO dispute resolution does not bode well for the
return to near perfect compliance with WTO enforcement norms. Until 2016, the system functioned as a man-
datory and binding legal system, even though the WTO never had the power to prevent unilateralism.
Nonetheless, member countries abided by the WTO’s enforcement norms and created one of the most effective
rule-based legal systems in international law.
Going forward, it will be hard for countries to credibly commit to returning to a mandatory rule-of-law system
in good times and bad. First, the precedent of widespread departures from WTO enforcement norms provides
national leaders with more freedom in crafting strategies to allegations of WTO breaches. Many complaining
countries may no longer wait for the WTO adjudicative process to play out and may respond immediately to
other countries’ alleged breaches. In addition, respondent countries may resist dispute settlement and start threat-
ening counterretaliation if complaining countries impose sanctions. The events of the last two years also change
the optics of such actions: these strategies seem less like an egregious violation of international law and more like a
reasonably available policy option. Furthermore, domestic constituencies may now have less sympathy for claims
that WTO rules pose a real constraint on national leaders, thus raising the already high political costs of abiding by
WTO rules and procedures.
Second, emerging economies, which have greater long-term concerns about whether theWTO rules are in their
national interests, may use the precedent of recent events to resist the application ofWTO rules. Countries such as
China, Brazil, and India may wish to push back on WTO intellectual property rules or rules that limit a country’s
ability to use subsidies broadly. These countries can use the recent precedent to justify departures from WTO
enforcement norms and force a return to power-based negotiations on these issues.18 Such threats maymaterialize
more in future years as the economic power of emerging economies grows.
If the WTO system is not able to return to a rule-of-law system, then the value of the WTO agreements and,
perhaps more importantly, the value of the WTO as a forum to resolve trade issues without threats will be notably
weakened. The meaning of WTO rules will depend on the disputing countries’ interpretations and the relative
power of each country to enforce its view. This creates uncertainty for countries trying to maintain the maximum
17 See Trade Talks, America May Be Doing Away with Dispute Settlement, Episode 60 (Oct. 28, 2018).
18 Rachel Brewster, The Trump Administration and the Future of Trade Agreements, 44 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE (Nov. 25, 2018).
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level of regulatory discretion in trade policy and yet comply withWTO rules, as well as for private industry trying to
make investments for the next decade. More importantly, it will make WTO law apply only to those who do not
have the power to resist other country’s interpretations.
The path ahead seems like a much rockier road than the last two decades, with the prospect of protracted trade
wars and uncertain trade law. TheWTO’s ability to be an important constraint on states will be substantially weak-
ened. Although the WTO will continue to operate, its influence is most likely to wane as the international trade
system returns to more unilateral adjudication and remedies.
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